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Clusters and Upgrading:
A purposeful approach*
Gerald A. McDermott

Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, USA••

Héctor O. Rocha

IAE Business School, Austral University, Argentina
Abstract. We develop a theoretical model to investigate how backward societies can improve their
upgrading capabilities by transforming existing industrial agglomerations into dynamic clusters. Our
main assumptions are two: first, emerging market economies are not uniform but characterized by
variety of subnational regional and sectoral organizational and institutional configurations; second,
the basic building block and unit of explanation in social sciences is personal action guided by some
intention, which is heterogeneous across different actors. Based on these assumptions and the literature
on human motives and social networks, we develop a purposeful approach to clusters and upgrading.
We argue that governments can develop institutions with private actors that facilitate new types of
relationships and improve the access local firms have to a variety of knowledge resources, a key ingredient to upgrading. We illustrate this argument revisiting the literature on clusters and upgrading in
Latin America and using two case studies in Argentina, a country better known for its volatility and
lack of optimal social capital and institutions. We conclude with avenues for further research.
Key words: clusters, upgrading, institutions, emerging economies, human motives

Over the past 15 years scholars of economic development and management have increasingly focused on the ability of emerging market firms and industries upgrade to compete
in the world – shifting from lower to higher value added activities based on a society’s
innovative capacities (Doner et al., 2005; Giuliani et al., 2005; Song, 2002). As Ghoshal
and Moran (1999) argue, a key puzzle for development is identifying the institutional
conditions that help firms create capabilities to continually improve their products, processes, and functions. This perspective emphasizes a purposeful or intentional approach
to innovation and growth that understands contexts as conditioning rather than determining human intentionality. (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Ghoshal, 2005).
* Paper presented at the Ibero Academy of Management, Buenos Aires, December 2009.
** Corresponding author. E-mail: Gerald.mcdermott@moore.sc.edu
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This approach coincides with broader debates about the creation of innovative capacities in a region. As captured in the “clusters” literature, these debates understand
upgrading as a product of the local organizational relationships, in which a firm is embedded (Rocha, 2004). The advantage of this literature has been its ability to show how
firm and regional strategies vary according to the ways firms learn from one another and
recombine local resources. The drawback in the literature, however, is that it tends to
conflate clusters with agglomeration (Rocha, 2004), presupposing new knowledge is
“in the air,” or views their structural traits as static (Tallman et al., 2004; Arikan, 2009).
These two problems are of particular importance to emerging market economies, such
as those in Latin America, since they often lack the requisite social and institutional
endowments that are viewed as vital for innovation and cluster governance (Schmitz,
1994; Rocha, 2006).
In this paper, we address these two shortcomings by showing how backward societies
can improve their upgrading capabilities by transforming existing industrial agglomerations into dynamic clusters. Conventional approaches to clusters and upgrading often
view development paths as determined by social and economic endowments or view
policy in terms of governments providing more R&D resources, liberalizing markets, or
facilitating the entry of foreign technology. In contrast, we suggest that social relationships are malleable and that governments can develop institutions with private actors
that facilitate new types of relationships and improve the access local firms have to a
variety of knowledge resources – a key ingredient to upgrading.
Our logic is as follows. First, following recent work on innovation (Chesbrough,
2005; Miles et al., 2005), we argue that both the creation of and access to knowledge
is largely relational, as it is often applied and tacit. Second, such relationships are not
evenly distributed across firms. Third, the questions then arises as to which types of
practices and policies can induce the development of learning relationships so as to
promote broad based upgrading. We will show that where relationships change in this
regard, firms and governments promote practices that are akin to what scholars call
“pragmatic collaboration” (MacDuffie, 2007, Helper et al., 2002) and “intrinsic collaboration” (Nahapiet et al., 2005).
We build this “purposeful approach” to upgrading and cluster by integrating recent
work in management and economic sociology. Ghoshal (2005) argues that the management literature’s overemphasis on ex ante rationality and maximization ignores the
possibility for collaboration where often none seems possible. Social phenomena cannot be explained in terms of causal determinism, because the “basic building block in
the social sciences, the elementary unit of explanation, is individual action guided by
some intention.” (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 78). In emphasizing the variety in the structure and
composition of networks, Granovetter (2002) suggests that organizations and institutions in a region can reshape relationships that facilitate or impede knowledge creation
and diffusion. Table 1 summarizes the purposeful view and contrasts it with the more
deterministic one underlying the key phenomena and relationships on clusters and upgrading.
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Table 1. Clusters and Upgrading – Deterministic and purposeful paradigms

Phenomena
Geographical
concentration of
organizations

Knowledge
Relationships
Upgrading

Deterministic

Purposeful

“Industrial Agglomerations or
proximate groups of firms belonging
to the same industry or closely related
industries that could potentially, but
not necessarily, interact” (Rocha &
Sternberg, 2005, p. 271)
In the air

“Clusters or geographically proximate
group of firms and associated
institutions in related industries,
linked by economic and social
interdependencies” (Rocha &
Sternberg, 2005, p. 270)
Co-created by interrelated
organizations
Developed & Dynamic
Result of both the context and the
purposeful action in the creation of
knowledge and the development of
relationships within a given context.

Static
Result of given stock of knowledge
and existing relationships. More
generally, determined by social and
economic endowments.

We illustrate our argument and views using as empirical setting Latin America in
general and Argentina in particular. Research interest in clusters has grown because of
its presumed impact on firm performance, regional economic development, and national competitiveness. Latin American countries are a natural setting for both research
and policy making on clusters given that this region includes some of the most inequitable socioeconomic environments in the world (Morley, 2001).
This paper is structured as follows. In Sections I and II, we define the key concepts
of our model in light of the literature on clusters, entrepreneurship, upgrading and regional development in Latin America. In Sections III and IV, we illustrate our argument
via two case studies in Argentina, a country better known for its volatility and lack of
optimal social capital and institutions. Implicit in these studies is a revelation of the
variety of clusters by industry and region. Our analysis of the autoparts sector in the
Province of Buenos Aires shows how knowledge diffusion and learning appears largely
due to certain types of customer-supplier relationships. Our analysis of the wine sector
in the provinces of Mendoza and San Juan then reveals how different paths of upgrading appear rooted in distinct public policies. Both cases reflect Ghoshal’s optimism for
practices and policies that can transform learning relationships between organizations.
We conclude with challenges for future research on development and upgrading in
firms operating in emerging regions and nations.

I. Clusters, knowledge, relationships and upgrading
Following a Schumpeterian (Schumpeter, 1934) and purposeful view of the firm (Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Ghoshal, 2005), we view product upgrading as a particular form
of innovation, in which firms focus on the creation of new products for higher value
by purposeful experiments with new combinations of existing inputs, processes and /
or products and services. As Fleming (2001) has argued, this process of recombina26

tion is fraught with technological and market uncertainties, demanding that firms gain
knowledge and expertise to convert different types of inputs into specific products, to
assess the reliability of suppliers, and to learn which types of products can gain traction in different market niches in the short and long run. While firms gain experience
from their own in-house activities and human capital, they access a variety of raw and
applied knowledge through their peers, customers, and suppliers as well as via nonmarket actors, such as trade associations and government support institutions (GSIs)
that provide training or R&D services (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). Durable social relationships between firms underpin their ability to undertake iterative, joint-experiments
and participate in the sustained provision of collective resources (McEvily & Marcus,
2002; Saxenian, 1994).
The closing years of the 20th century saw a growing awareness among scholars and
practitioners of the importance of intangible assets as the primary source of competitive
advantage. Both knowledge and relationships are two of these assets (Nahapiet et al.,
2005; Miles et al., 2005). In fact, the knowledge-based view of the firm, as it has come
to be known, considers knowledge as the most strategically significant resource of the
firm (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Research and experience have shown that a knowledge
economy is also a relational economy since the structure and quality of relationships
are a major influence on both the creation and exploitation of knowledge (cf. Nahapiet
et al., 2005, for a review).
Following the extent literature on clusters (Rocha, 2004; Rocha & Sternberg, 2005),
we distinguish between industrial agglomerations and clusters. Industrial agglomerations “are proximate groups of firms belonging to the same industry or closely related
industries that could potentially, but not necessarily, interact” (Rocha & Sternberg,
2005, p. 271). Clusters are more comprehensive phenomena, including two additional
dimensions to the geographical one: the intersectoral and the inter-organizational ones.
Clusters refer to geographical concentrations of interdependent firms, government
agencies, and non-governmental organizations in related industries.1
As stated in the introduction, the main argument of the paper is that clusters promote knowledge creation and diffusion via specific constellations of ties among firms,
associations, schools and GSIs. In accessing the diverse knowledge resources, firms can
upgrade their products with greater value and speed than otherwise. Figure 1 summarizes this argument. This model will guide the two case studies we use as empirical setting for our purposeful approach on clusters and upgrading. However, we first briefly review the literature on clusters, entrepreneurship, upgrading and regional development
in emerging markets in general and LATAM in particular in the next section.

1 The concept of clusters was introduced by M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations,

The Free Press, New York (1990). The study of clusters can be traced to the work of Marshall on
industrial districts. See A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., MacMillan, London (1966).
For a detailed review of the literature on clusters, see Rocha (2004).
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Knowledge

Upgrading

Clusters

Relationships
Figure 1. Clusters and upgrading – ex-ante relationships

II. Clusters and upgrading in emerging markets2
The previous description of upgrading is widely embraced in studies of a variety of industries in developing countries. (Guiliani et al., 2005) What is less clear is how clusters might contribute to this. As Rocha (2004, 2006) explains, the literature on clusters
and industrial agglomerations has several views of the level of analysis and the relevant
mechanisms.
Given these shortcomings, two empirical studies highlight the importance of conceptually and empirically distinguishing between clusters and other types of agglomerations. To this purpose, they compare sets of firms within and not within clusters and
industrial agglomerations.
The first study reviews 19 empirical studies with a total of 146 Latin American clusters showed that clusters contribute to growth at the firm and regional levels but that
they are also a potential source of socioeconomic division (Rocha, 2006). Clusters
show positive impacts on economic development indicators such as innovation capacity, employment training and growth, product upgrading, and production and exports.
However, they have no impact on functional and inter-sectoral upgrading, and a negative impact on economic and social equality. The causes of these results are the weak
inter-firm and institutional links within clusters and with the local economy. The presence of clusters tends, in many instances, to be associated with inequalities in terms
of both incomes and opportunities if alternative governance mechanisms and ways of
rooting firms in the local economy are not taken into account. Here, research and practice on inter-firm collaboration could greatly improve economic and social conditions
at the societal level.
Another study on Argentine clusters arrives at similar conclusions (Rocha et al.,
2004). It takes as the unit of analysis the industry-territory, defined as the presence of
2

This section draws its conclusions from Rocha (2006) and the comparison between Latin
America and Germany presented at the Plenary Session on Building Competitive Export Capacity
of Developing Countries and Firms, XI United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, Sao
Paulo, Brazil, June 14-18 (2004).
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at least one plant within an Argentinean county. A total of 5,052 industry-territories
located across 467 Argentinean counties were identified. Following previous literature
(cf. Rocha, 2004; Rocha & Sternberg, 2005) this study classifies different industry-territories in terms of their specialisation and presence of networks. The empirical model
uses multiple regression–fixed effects to test the impact of clusters on entrepreneurship
and regional development.
While the study finds that clusters tend to promote entrepreneurship and regional
development, access to specialized inputs, skills, and demand appears to be a function
not of pure agglomeration but rather inter-firm and institutional networks within geographical boundaries. Prior studies have equated industrial agglomerations to clusters
(Baptista & Swann, 1998), but the lack of distinction among them hides important
causal mechanisms affecting entrepreneurship and regional development. These different mechanisms seem not to be fully operative in Argentinean clusters and their emergent nature in terms of lack of developed networks could explain their small positive
differential impact on entrepreneurship and regional development when compared to
industrial agglomerations and clusters in general.
From the policy standpoint, the small but better contribution of emergent clusters
to entrepreneurship and regional development when compared to industrial agglomerations suggests that the creation of conditions for more interaction among agglomerated organisations could be beneficial to those outputs.
What are the key assumptions underlying the reviews and empirical tests provided by
these studies? The first assumption is that different agglomerations are not just different
labels but different phenomena which have different impacts. The second assumption is
that the focus is at the regional level of analysis, showing how different configurations
of contexts and networks within them result in different outputs in terms of upgrading
and entrepreneurship. Finally, this regional focus deliberately makes agency an exogenous
variable and therefore its influence on upgrading cannot be isolated. As pointed out in a
previous work, “(a) main criticism of the network approach to cluster is its emphais on the
socio-territorial embeddedness of knowledge and innovation. The individual (…) dimension is also important and therefore it is not necessary to be locally embedded to transfer
knowledge (…) It seems that proximity matters when knowledge spillovers are informal.
On the other hand, when knowledge is transmitted through formal mechanisms such as
participation in boards or joint ventures, proximity appears to be less important (Audretsch
& Stephan, 1996, Rocha, 2004, p. 377). Therefore, despite the different approaches to
clusters, at their limit they all rely on a form of structural and economic determinism. For
instance, the economics literature often depicts innovation occurring in regions that have
superior ex ante endowments in human, natural, and financial capital or an ex ante superior density of firms (Rocha, 2004). In this view, knowledge is “in the air”, readily available
for all firms, especially those with high level of absorptive capacities or knowledge stocks.
This view is often coupled in the development literature with institutional views, which
emphasize the importance of an ex ante system of clear private property rights and clear
boundaries between the state and the market.
29

Underpinning this view, which often promotes the value of MNCs as sources of new
knowledge for local firms, is a form of technological determinism. The more traditional
view based on incentives and market forces would argue that once MNCs have reorganized supply lines and allowed market competition to weed out the weak firms, surviving
suppliers would in general have similar levels of upgrading. A similar perspective comes
from a variant of the “modularization view” in the automotive literature. Each production
tier depends on a discreet package of technologies and interfaces, which are increasingly
standardized and well-codified, and in turn, allows little need for inter-firm coordination.
At its limit, this largely technologically deterministic view understands that once the value
chain is established, modularization permits arm’s length, market based relationships between suppliers and customers to be sufficient for sustaining global supply chains and
increased upgrading (Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon & Florida, 2004).
Oddly enough, critics of this optimism, also rely on such determinism but with a
different interpretation. This is typical of the aforementioned conceptualization of “hierarchical clusters.” (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003; Giuliani et al., 2005). While the
transnationalization of production forces domestic firms to reside in the second and
third tiers, the logic of modularization relegates firms in these tiers to produce only
standardized components, impeding their ability to learn about new products and
processes and thus upgrade over time. The technological imperative of the auto industry creates a “glass ceiling” for upgrading in lower tier, mainly domestic, firms as it determines the incentives and relationships that contribute to upgrading. For instance, in
their analyses of the automotive industry in Latin America, Humphrey & Memedovic
(2003) and Quadros (2004) argue that although market pressures and the introduction
of international standards compel surviving suppliers to make initial improvements in
products and processes, the use of modularization restricts the access that suppliers in
the lower tiers have to the new information, knowledge, and development activities of
the international assemblers and their allied international top tier suppliers. These isolated suppliers have limited internal resources and knowledge to upgrade on their own.
In turn, one would expect that firms in the second and third tiers have similar levels of
upgrading, respectively, but less improvements relative to firms in the first tier.
Although sociological views are very aware of the relational factors shaping upgrading, their application to clusters often resides in binary understanding of the embeddedness rooted in the determinism of inherited social capital. Upgrading is likely to
occur in societies historically rich in networks and the attendant social capital that are
enduring and manifested in the relative density of associations and cooperatives as well
as pre-existing coherent public policies (Grabher & Stark, 1996; Putnam et al., 1993).
In contrast, this paper cuts through these determinisms by building on recent work
on purposeful view of firms (Ghoshal, 2005), innovation (Chesbrough, 2005; Miles
et al., 2005), and embeddedness (Lin, 2001) that increasingly seek to differentiate the
relative impact of a firm’s network composition and structure on both its capabilities
and performance. Nan Lin (2001) has argued forcefully that an individual’s or firm’s
network is composed of different types of organizations, which in turn, provide dif30

ferent types of resources and information that can shape the actor’s performance in
different ways. In particular, Lin argues that researchers should pay closer attention to
an actor’s network resources, which are embedded in one’s ego-networks, and not simply to an actor’s total number of overall ties or an actor’s location in the network. The
key insight that we exploit in here is whether the focal firm has ties to a certain type of
organization (e.g., customer, supplier, trade association, etc.) that can lend knowledge
resources that are of value for the task at hand. We then push this view further to explore how certain types of relationship emerge through purposeful action by market or
government actors.
This view has three important implications for the study of clusters and upgrading. First, clusters vary in the types of organizations that can provide new knowledge
resources. These may be other firms, schools, associations, etc. as well as GSIs. Most
importantly, the assumptions on human nature and relationships underlying the interaction between the actors of the cluster are key determinants of the process and results.
For the sustainability of the cluster and its impact on upgrading, assumptions such as a
focus on long-term relationships rather short-term gains and instrumental relationships
are of utmost importance.
Second, relational quality may be attached to certain organizations. That is, not all
ties are the same, and only a few may offer the active exchange of knowledge. Knowledge transfer and capabilities creation depends on the particular quality and intensity of the relationships that suppliers have with their main customers (Christensen &
Bower, 1996; Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Sako, 2004). The underlying idea is that strong ties
gradually promote and enhance trust, reciprocity, and a long-term perspective, which
in turn helps partners develop joint projects and share tacit knowledge. To continue
with the above example of traditional manufacturing, researchers on the automotive
industry have increasingly focused on these types of customer-supplier relationships,
calling them “pragmatic collaborations,” (MacDuffie & Helper, 2006; Herrigel, 2004)
as firms jointly invest in specific routines and interactions that “permit the transfer, recombination or creation of specialized knowledge” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 665). In
this view, new knowledge and capabilities emerge for suppliers when they engage in
regular, disciplined discussions with customers about product designs and processes
that yield joint experiments and routinized collective problem solving. Such routines
tend to develop when customers commit to assisting suppliers in product and process
innovations, such as bi-lateral production programs and focused supplier associations
(Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Helper & Kiehl, 2004).
Third, certain relational and organizational traits of the ties within a community
may be dense, but can insulate firms from new information and relationships with
members of other communities. As Lin (2001) and Uzzi (1996) have shown, one’s
ego-network can easily restrict access to different resources and blind it from new information because of the strength of immediate ties and the limited variety of valuable
information and resources that its alters (other organizations, firms, etc.) can pass on.
That is, although a region on aggregate may have a wide variety of resources and expe31

riences that, when combined, could create value, a firm is often embedded in a rather
restricted network, be it composed of firms, associations or public agencies (Knoke,
2001). At a more macro-level of analysis, recent work public policy has sought to show
that although a society may contain a plethora of, e.g., professional associations, the
attendant social ties and norms that can promote collaboration and collective learning
can also be self-limiting and exclusionary. To the extent that these groups and localities
have different needs and resources, are relatively isolated, and are not incorporated into
more encompassing institutions, a diverse socio-economic environment can easily produce a balkanized society that thwarts broad-based innovation, knowledge diffusion,
and concerted action (Locke, 1995; Ostrom, 1999; Safford, 2007; Schneider, 2004;
Tendler, 1997). The lack of collective goods and coherent policies is rooted not in the
absence of social ties but their insulating qualities and the lack of cross cutting between
ties producer communities and their respective associations.
To sum up, the previous empirical studies have shown the conceptual, empirical and
policy importance of distinguishing between clusters and other types of agglomerations. To this purpose, they have compared a set of firms within and not within clusters
and industrial agglomerations. We now advance a step forward. To consider a more
dynamic understanding of clusters and their upgrading potential, one must consider
both the relational qualities and the composition of networks in a cluster. In doing so,
one can then better identify the constraints on learning and the types of strategies and
policies that can alleviate them. That is, the first step is to recognize how productive
relationships are distributed but also malleable. The second step is to consider the ways
in which public and private can change the quality and structure of the networks by
altering the composition and routines of the network actors.
We illustrate these points via two case studies. Our first is on the autoparts sector,
which will establish the relational foundations of knowledge flows and how these relationships vary according to the type of organization and quality of the tie. We then turn
to the Argentine wine industry to show how public policy can alter existing network
ties and improve ones access to knowledge resources.

III. The Buenos Aires autoparts cluster and
the determinants of upgrading3
During the 1990s, Argentina became a leader of pro-market reforms in Latin America,
with the cornerstones being a currency board, fiscal stability, price and trade liberalization, and privatization. These efforts brought price stability as well as dramatic increases
in growth, trade, and investment. Similar to such countries as Mexico and Brazil, Argentina also sought to revive its automotive industry, the output of which had declined
to about 100,000 units by 1989, by using focused policies to attract FDI and enhance
trade in both vehicles and autoparts, albeit with little attention on supporting supply3
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This section draws heavily from McDermott & Corredoira (2009).

side policies, such as the development of quasi-public institutions for improving R&D
and training (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003; Yoguel et al., 2002). The combination
of high powered economic incentives and investment by the automotive MNCs was to
lead to increased production as well as improved capabilities for domestic suppliers.
First, as was the case in many other emerging market countries (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003), the MNCs (i.e., the international assemblers and allied top tier suppliers) took charge of massively reorganizing the industry to establish three tiers of suppliers
and diffuse the principles of lean production throughout the value chain. The first tier is
dominated by foreign firms, which are responsible for complete systems, followed by the
second tier (subsystems), and the third tier (components and standard inputs). Suppliers
were given strong market incentives to improve quality and reduce costs by incorporating
such practices as JIT, TQM, statistical process control, and six sigma. Argentine suppliers
also had to regularly adapt their products to feed approximately 17–20 different platforms
and 24 models, 16 of which were exclusively for the Argentine market and 3 of which
changed annually (cf. McDermott & Corredoira, 2009).
By the late 1990s, these changes allowed for significant increases in sales, investment,
and productivity as well as a reduction of the supplier by about half. Given their ability
to survive the turbulence of the 1990s and their similar geographical proximity, then the
local autoparts suppliers are to have similar likelihoods of upgrading their processes and
products. To the extent they vary, we can discern the relative impact of a firm’s internal
resources, the composition of its network ties, and the quality of these ties.
McDermott & Corredoira (2009) studied these issues via a unique 1999 survey
data set of all surviving suppliers in Buenos Aires province, which accounted for approximately 55% of the sales and employment of the autoparts sector. In turn, given the
research setting, to the extent that variation in upgrading of the surviving firms is largely
driven by certain types of inter-organizational relationships, the evidence would tend to
support a growing view about the roles of networks and institutions in the development
of emerging markets.
This study ran two types of quantitative analyses, with the dependent variables as
whether the focal firm undertook significant product and process upgrading. The first
type of analysis was logistic regressions for each dependent variable. The second type
of analysis was the use of the delta method to discern the inter-action effects of type
of tie and the tier of the supplier, the summarized results of which are given in Tables
2 and 3. Most suppliers in Tiers 2 and 3 were domestically owned, small and medium
sized firms.
The results highlight the relative value of a firm’s social ties to certain organizations
and institutions as well as the importance of collaborative relationships between customers and suppliers. First, the results for the variables measuring the impact of the
social and professional ties a firm has to different types of organizations suggest that the
value of the ties is not uniform, but varies significantly according the type of organization. Ties to some actors within and outside the value chain, like assemblers, suppliers,
and universities, appear to improve the likelihood of process and product upgrading,
33

Table 2. Comparing the effect of linkages to different alters

Linkage
measure

New Product

New Process

Tier1

Tier2

Tier3

Tier1

Assemblers

(↓) across
full range

(↑) first few
ties

(=) no
impact

(↑) first few (↑) first few (↑) first few
ties
ties
ties

Customers

(=) no
impact

(↓) mostly
first ties

(=) no
impact

(↓) first few
ties

(=) no
impact

(=) no
impact

Suppliers

(=) no
impact

(↑) first few (↑) first few (↓) first few
ties
ties
ties

(=) no
impact

(↓) first few
ties

Peers

(=) no
impact

(↑) mostly
first ties

(=) no
impact

(=) no
impact

(=) no
impact

(↑) first few
ties

Tier2

Tier3

Table 3. Comparing the marginal impact of ties

Linkage
measure

New Product

New Process

Tier 1 vs Tier 2

Tier 1 vs Tier 3

Tier 1 vs Tier 2 Tier 1 vs Tier 3

Assemblers

Tier 2>Tier 1
(significant above
5 ties, p-value 0.01 to
0.10)

Tier 3>Tier 1
(significant above 10
ties, p-value 0.05 to
0.10)

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

Customers

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

Suppliers

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

Peers

No significant
difference

Tier 1>Tier 3
(significant across full
range, p-value 0.05
to 0.10)

No significant
difference

No significant
difference

while ties to other types of organizations and institutions may constrain or offer few
relevant resources and information to firms.
Second, it appears that the value a supplier gains from social ties to other firms in the
value chain in many ways interacts with its structural position in the value chain or Tier.
These results are captured in Table 4. For instance, social ties to assemblers appear to
facilitate upgrading for suppliers in Tiers 2 and 3, which tend to be small and medium
sized domestic firms, but social ties to their peers appear to have value for suppliers in
Tier 1, which tend to be MNCs. These sets of results coincide with recent research emphasizing the notion that emerging market firms can gain new knowledge from social
ties to MNCs and participating in R&D programs in universities, but that their local
34

TABLE 4. Public-Private Institutions in Mendoza created in the 1990s

Institution

Year of creation or restructuring

INTA EEAs

1991; INTA
San Juan
reformed in
1996

Fondo
Vitivinicola

1993-94

Fondo para
la Transformacion y el
Crecimiento
(FTC)

1993-94

Instituto De- 1994-95
sarrollo Rural
(IDR)

Instituto
1994
Tecnologico
Universitario
(ITU)
Pro Mendoza 1995-96

Governing
Members
Gov’t of Mza,
15 Agro Ass’ns,
Nat’l and Prov’l
Institutes and
Univ’s

Activities
R&D (inputs,
plants, tech),
extension training, consulting

Resources

50% – Gov’t
budget (salaries
& overhead);
50% – services,
alliances, cooperadoras
Gov’t Mza, 11 Oversees new
Tax on firms
wine/grape
wine regulafrom over
Ass’ns
tions, promotes produc’n of
wine industry/ wine
marketing
Gov’t Mza, Re- Subsidized loans Self-financing;
gional advisory and credit guar- initial capital
councils, ass’ns antees to SMEs from gov’t
for tech. against
extreme weather
& for grape conversion
36 founders – Technical info
Mza Gov’t; serINTA Cuyo,
collection &
vices; gradual
Gov’t Mza, 2
disseminaincrease of fees
peak ass’ns,
tion; Data base from member
various agro
mgmt; R&D,
ass’ns
sectoral ass’ns training, consulting
Founders –
Continuing
Founders; fees
Gov’t Mza,
education for
for services
Univ Nacional managers and
Cuyo, UTN, 2 some R&D in
peak ass’ns
mgmt and technology
Gov’t Mza, 3
Export
Gov’t Mza;
peak business
promotion –
Peak ass’ns;
associations
organize fairs,
services
delegations,
strategic
information,
training

Legal Form
Part of INTA
Cuyo; 4 in
Mza, 1 in SJ;
Public, Nonstate, nonprofit entity
Public, nonstate, nonprofit entity
Independent
legal entity
under authority of governor
Non-profit
Foundation;
with oversight
by Min of
Economy
Non-profit
Foundation

Non-profit
Foundation

Abbreviations: INTA – Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria; EEA – Estaciones Experimentales
(Sub-regional centers); Mza – Mendoza; Cooperadoras – Non-profit NGOs.
Source: Adapted from McDermott (2007, p. 123)
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organizational and institutional environments may be too weak to offer relevant resources and information (Conceição et al., 2003; Giuliani et al., 2005). The research on
Argentina, especially in the province of Buenos Aires, has shown that the policies of the
1990s largely ignored investment into institutions that provide knowledge resources,
particularly those related to manufacturing (Sutz 2000; Casaburi et al., 1999).
Third, the evidence suggests that the quality of inter-firm relationships and not simply
the quantity of social ties may be especially beneficial for upgrading. We highlight the
strong positive effectiveness of the Assitance variables in the regressions and the marginal
effects of certain ties found in Table 5. While our analysis of the marginal effects points
to diminishing returns on upgrading for the addition of many social ties, our Assistance
variables appear to significantly improve the likelihood of a supplier’s ability to upgrade
its products and processes. A few strong ties, grounded in discrete programs that induce
pragmatic collaboration can help firms learn faster than others. Such findings tend to support recent research arguing that collaborative, joint problem-solving relationships rooted
in customer initiated assistance programs are likely to facilitate learning and knowledge
transfer for suppliers (Dyer & Hatch, 2006; MacDuffie & Helper, 2006).
These results suggest two important implications for the study of clusters. First, as
emphasized in this above, analysis of relational factors is likely to yield more valuable
insights for managers and policymakers in emerging markets to the extent it can begin
to differentiate the relative impact of different types of inter-organizational relationships on upgrading. Our analysis tried to distinguish the value of relationships according to the type of organization, to which a firm is tied, and the quality of the tie. We also
found that the impact of certain social ties can vary according to one’s tier. As several
network scholars have increasingly argued (Burt, 2000; Lin, 2001; Gulati et al., 2000),
considerations about the variety of network resources, be they by interacting structural
and relational variables or parsing out strong and weak ties, allow one to identify more
consistently how certain types of knowledge resources flow through distinct patterns of
relationships. Such an approach also allows one to identify which types of relationships
and organizations may constrain upgrading or lack the relevant resources and knowledge to support upgrading. For instance, in some contexts MNCs might be the key
source of knowledge while in others collaborative ties among local firms and their institutions might create relative advantage, regardless of the type of industry.
In the context of the Argentine automotive industry, non-market organizations and
institutions appear weak as supporters of upgrading, while domestic firms appear more
likely to benefit from collaborative relationships with assemblers and their customers.
As mentioned above, this is an increasingly common observation from the case-based
research in Latin American and other emerging market countries (Gereffi et al., 2005;
Rocha, 2006). The issue is not simply whether economic activity is embedded or not
in a robust cluster, but rather how network resources vary in an industry or region and
what types of firm strategies and public policies can effectively reconfigure them.
Most importantly, given our purposeful approach, intentional explanations play a
key role. If MNCs view emerging economies as a resource platform, then increasing
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disparity rather than sustainable development is expected to happen in LATAM. On
the other side, if MNCs view emerging economies as a key arena for re-combining their
global knowledge with the specific knowledge of the local base, sustainable development is the expected result. This trend, called “becoming indigenous” (Hart, 2005) is
the current trend shaping the globalization – localization debate.
Second, to the extent that certain types of inter-organizational relationships are
likely to be exclusive and unequally distributed across firms, a key issue for scholars of
international business and development alike is discerning how they come about or can
be expanded to a greater variety of actors. We now turn to this issue in our analysis of
the Argentine wine industry in two provinces.

IV. Argentine wine upgrading – New institutions to transform relationships
This section draws on McDermott, Corredoira, and Kruse’s (2009) unique qualitative
and quantitative analysis of the transformation of the Argentine wine sector in the two
neighboring, dominant winemaking provinces of Mendoza and San Juan. After a long
history of backwardness and virtually no international presence, the Argentine wine
sector witnessed a dramatic turnaround in the 1990s and now accounts for over 3 percent of the $16 billion global wine market. This revival has been based on significant
innovations in quality control and design of new wines and grapes (McDermott, 2007).
Mendoza has led this change as the dominant exporter and innovator, pioneering a new
constellation of institutions and inter-firm networks that appears to have facilitated
wide spread product upgrading. San Juan, in contrast, remained a laggard, despite its
numerous firms, high density of associations, and policies that ushered in new investment. In turn, by identifying how Mendoza created a new path of innovation so different from its own past and from its neighbor, we can highlight the types of institutional
mechanisms that help firms access a variety of knowledge resources and learn.
By analyzing a single industry over time in two neighboring provinces, we can highlight not simply the different types of clusters that exist, but especially how government policy can change the relationships and world views of private actors. This goes to
the heart of Ghoshal’s claim about the importance of an intrinsic approach – while the
above discussion of the autoparts clusters highlighted the role and variation in social
relations for innovation, this study reveals the ways in which government can change
these relationships over time and improve the access firms have to a variety of knowledge resources.
We argue here that product upgrading depends on a firm being tied not simply to
any or many organizations and GSIs, but rather to those that act as social and knowledge
bridges across distinct producer communities and in turn offer firms access to a variety
of knowledge resources. In particular, we highlight the ways in which governments can
alter the trajectory of product upgrading not simply through largess or market liberalization but by developing a new set of GSIs with a variety of previously isolated, even
antagonistic, stakeholder groups. To the extent that GSIs are constituted with rules of
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inclusion and participatory governance for relevant public and private actors, they can
anchor new multiplex, cross-cutting ties between producer communities that underpin their ability to provide firms with a new scale and scope of services and facilitate
new problem solving relationships between them. That is, governments can reshape
the structure and composition of organizational fields, and in turn, knowledge flows, by
instigating the creation of new public-private institutions that recombine existing social and knowledge resources in new ways and at different levels of society (Campbell,
2004; Stark & Bruszt, 1998; Thelen, 2003).
The relational view of product upgrading is widely embraced in studies of developing countries in general and wine in particular (Giuliani & Bell, 2005; Perez-Aleman,
2005; Roberts & Ingram, 2002; Swaminathan, 2001). Upgrading in wine takes several
years, beginning with transforming the middle segments of the value chain: state-ofthe-art quality control and product development running from careful vineyard maintenance to flawless harvests to fermentation and blending. Enologists work closely
with agronomists and growers to introduce, evaluate, and document experiments with
new methods of growing and fermentation for different types of varietals and clones.
Because of the variation in climates and soils, experimentation is contextualized and
knowledge is often tacit, posing barriers to dissemination and application elsewhere.
In turn, to accelerate product upgrading, wineries gain a variety of market and applied
technical knowledge from other firms as well as collective resources housed in industry
associations, schools, and GSIs.
Such coordination and relational-based upgrading is not necessarily forthcoming,
however, especially for firms embedded in volatile environments with limited resources
and potentially fragmented industry structures. Developing countries, such as Argentina, are widely known for their lack of collective knowledge resources, weak markets,
and limited state capacities (Doner et al., 2005; Schmitz, 1994). Moreover, although
diversity and a decentralized industry structure can be sources of innovation, they can
also exacerbate the problems of concerted action and block the wide-spread diffusion of new practices ( Jacobs, 1984; Romanelli & Khessina, 2003). Mendoza and San
Juan have over 100 micro-climates supporting a wide variety of high value grapes and
thousands of small vineyards, which typically supply 30-50% of a winery’s needs. Both
provinces still have over 680 and 170 wineries, respectively, which range from many
small and medium family firms to some cooperatives and a few large diversified corporations.4 Over three hundred wineries export, with relatively low concentration ratios
by international standards.
4 On the variety and decentralized structure of wine and grape production, see Cetrangolo et
al. (2002) and Ruiz & Vila (2003). According to the data from the Instituto Nacional Vitvinicola
(INV), there were still over 16,000 vineyards in Mendoza and 6,000 in San Juan; vineyards in both
provinces with less than 25 has. still accounted for about 92% of the total number and 60% of surface
area. According to the 2003 agricultural survey of vineyards in Mendoza, the largest 18 vineyard
owners control only 5% of vineyard surface area, and about 1100 owners control 50%. (Authors’
calculations for both sets of figures.)
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IVa. Comparing Mendoza and San Juan
Given the coordination problems associated with product upgrading, our comparison
of the two transformation paths focuses on two related questions that link the mechanisms of upgrading with broader policy problems of development. How were a broad
set of firms able to upgrade their products and exploit variety rather than being paralyzed by it? What types of new institutional mechanisms were created to help firms
access a variety of knowledge resources and learn?
Typical analyses would rely on the inherited economic and social endowments of
the two provinces as determinants for the different paths. But in showing in detail the
limitations of these approaches, McDermott (2007) revealed how the two provinces
had a similar socio-economic structure, which then diverged in the 1990s because of
new policies in Mendoza. It is especially noteworthy for the clusters literature that both
provinces had similar level of SME density, natural resources, human resources, and
stock measures of social capital. While the two provinces had similar indicators of associationalism and business-government relationships through the 1980s, a key problem
for knowledge creation was the fragmented nature of social and political life between
producer communities or Zonas within the provinces. For instance, while firms within
particular Zonas, such as the Zona Primera and the Zona Este, often learned from one
another and had their own trade associations to lobby the government for subsidies,
they viewed their counterparts in other Zonas as rivals, from whom they had little to
learn. The traditional policy making in the provinces of zero-sum games on price supports also reinforced weak horizontal ties between sectoral and zonal associations and
ad hoc vertical ties between just a few associations and the government (Paladino &
Jauregui, 2001; Rofman, 1999). Figure 2 gives a simplified depiction of this structure of
policy making in the wine industry in Mendoza in 1987. One could give a similar depiction of San Juan in both the 1980s and 1990s.
The need for more specific applied knowledge and skills, coupled with regional
prejudices and resource inequalities, can create barriers to the processes of aggregation
and joint action vital for a sustainable base of innovation. As discussed above, public
policy can remedy this problem by initiating a process in which public and private actors create new institutions with governance principles that anchor new horizontal ties
between previously isolated producer communities. Such a view shifts the comparative
lens of upgrading paths away from the existing economic and social endowments of
regions and toward their institution-building processes.
A fruitful comparative analysis, in turn, focuses on how the contrasting policies toward
resolving a common crisis in the late 1980s in the two regions led to the formation of
different organizational and institutional arrangements in the 1990s. With the Argentine
economy stagnating and the wine industry collapsing, the focal points of the crisis were
both provinces’ respective state-owned, perennial loss-making wineries, Cavic in San Juan
and Giol in Mendoza, whose purchasing contracts and inflated prices effectively promoted the production of large volumes of low-quality wine (Azpiazu & Basualdo, 2003). San
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FIGURE 2. Policymaking and strategic ties in the Mendoza wine industry, 1988
NB. Guide for both Figures 1 and 2: Solid black circles represent firms in different regions in Mendoza. Each
region has its main wine business association, as shown by the large white arrow. Dashed lines represent weaker
links of contracting or communication than solid lines. Solid arrows denote membership and board participation in relevant associations and institutions.

Juan’s government sought to insulate itself and rapidly impose high-powered, arm’s-length
economic incentives on society to induce change. It first chose to rapidly privatize the
Cavic to local interests, brushing off the protests of dependent small grape growers and
wineries. The firm soon failed again, causing the government to intervene and liquidate it.
Then through the 1990s, the government focused on attracting new investment through a
federally subsidized tax incentive. By most accounts this policy did bring in record levels of
investment to the wine industry but failed to encourage broad based upgrading. The economic benefits remained concentrated among a few large firms that had little interest in
incorporating and diffusing new practices along the value chain. The top down approach
also exacerbated the fragmentation and animosities among relevant sectoral associations
and the state, and perpetuated the old strategies of divide and rule cum rent-seeking. For
instance, on several occasions during the 1990s, different sectoral associations proposed
new institutions to support training and export promotion. Each attempt failed, with the
state and the associations accusing each other of free-riding and attempting to gain control of state resources.
In contrast, Mendoza gradually built a new set of GSIs to provide a variety of new
support services and resources in agriculture and especially the winemaking value chain
(e.g., hazard insurance, training, R&D, export promotion, etc.). The first experiment
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came in 1987-88, when the newly elected provincial administration chose to transform
Giol into Fecovita, a federation of cooperatives, which were created from the previously
dependent thousands of small grape growers and wineries. This experience not only
revitalized the cooperative sector, but also initiated a broader effort by the Mendoza
government to create Public Private Institutions (PPIs) de novo and then later reform
existing GSIs with socio-economic partners over ten years (McDermott, 2007).
Table 6 gives an abridged description of the most prominent PPIs, their different
support activities, and shared governance traits. They are public-private in their legal
form, governance structures, resources, and membership, which includes representatives from the government and associations of a variety of zones and sub-sectors. As
a sub-group of GSIs, they too received at least partial public funding, had state representatives on their boards, and had a public mandate.
But the aforementioned characteristics made the PPIs distinct from the pre-existing
GSIs, since the latter were state/bureaucratic centered in their governance and had only
ad hoc contact with a few elite groups instead of having governance and resource ties
to a variety of associations. They were also distinct from the pre-existing sectoral and
zonal associations, since the latter were voluntary organizations with no government
representation or resources, were narrow in membership and mission, and had few
services other than lobby the government as mentioned above.
Our particular interest is how the distinct governance rules of PPIs anchored their
ability to act as multiplex bridges (Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Burt, 1992) between the
public and private domains as well as between the relevant producer communities, and
in turn create mechanisms to improve firm access to a variety of knowledge resources.
Figure 3 gives a simplified depiction of this new structure and the role of PPIs in Mendoza in 2000. The combination of these governance rules and network qualities in PPIs
fostered three mechanisms to transmit a new variety of applied knowledge to firms.
First, in combining the material and informational contributions of the public and
private participants, the PPIs gradually built up knowledge resources at a scale, scope
and cost that the government and the associations could not have provided individually and did not exist before or in other provinces. For instance, INTA Mendoza, IDR,
and ProMendoza pioneered new detailed mappings of the micro-climates for grapes
and other agricultural products; data bases on best practices (internationally and subregionally), harvests, and product markets; benchmarking and training programs for
different sectors and zones; and teams of experienced consultants. The staff acquired
such contextualized knowledge from the input of the associations themselves, their
own research, and the various service contracts with constituent firms. Similar to the
technology centers described by McEvily & Zaheer (2004), these PPIs became public
repositories of diverse practices and standards and also of repackaged knowledge to be
adapted to particular settings.
Second, PPIs produced services that integrated the needs of their different constituencies with international standards. The leverage of each participant came from
its ability to provide or withhold resources as well as its ability to voice proposals and
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FIGURE 3. Policymaking and strategic ties in the Mendoza wine industry, 2000

grievances through the board. Third, the PPIs built programs to help firms learn from
one another and create new relationships. Both firm managers and directors of these
institutions repeatedly told us that one of the most valued qualities of services was the
way they helped to diffuse standards, practices, and experiences from one zone or sector to another. A typical example of an indirect method was the use of INTA Mendoza’s
testing labs and viticulture consultants by a variety of firms, from the most elite to the
fragile cooperatives. With this diverse experience, INTA Mendoza began documenting, benchmarking, and teaching practices from the most advanced form of computer
monitored drip-watering to new applications of the more traditional orthogonal vine
training systems. The most common examples of a more direct method of knowledge
transmission and relationship building was the use by INTA, IDR, and ProMendoza of
multi-firm training and research programs based on collective problem-solving techniques.
By the end of the 1990s, the overlapping ties and demonstration effects of the new
institutions channeled spillovers across policy domains and provinces. Within Mendoza, the older, more archaic institutions and GSIs, such as the regional university, the
province’s phytosanitary regulator, and the national regulating agency for wine, began
to change their programs, standards, and governance structures largely due to their participation in new advisory councils and industry support programs. The Mendoza gov42

ernment and associations also spearheaded the replication of the institutional model
at a national level that was signed into law in late 2004. Beginning in 2002, the San
Juan government openly criticized the old approach of tax incentives and advocated
the creation of new public-private institutional resources for training, R&D, and export
promotion. Indeed, the government explicitly mentioned INTA San Juan, INTA Mendoza’s satellite center, as an exemplary model (Gobierno de San Juan, 2004).
In sum, Mendoza’s approach to building new GSIs appears to have helped induce upgrading by improving the access firms had to a variety of knowledge resources and functioning akin to the “network facilitator” role discussed by McEvily & Zaheer (2004).
The rules of inclusion and multi-party governance helped representatives of previously
isolated producer communities gradually forge common strategies and a coherent, dynamic set of support policies with the state. Consequently, the programs and services
of the relevant institutions helped firms learn how to apply new knowledge with existing natural inputs and build new relationships with one another. With statistical techniques, we now explore the degree to which this new constellation of organizational
and institutional ties, once it had taken root, improved a firm’s product upgrading.
IVb. Network composition and product upgrading
In collaboration with IAE of Buenos Aires and IDR of Mendoza, McDermott et al.
(2009) designed and implemented a survey of about 120 wineries from all zones of
Mendoza and San Juan in 2004-05. The survey had a 90% response rate and focused
on measuring the upgrading capabilities of firms, their demographics, and their publicprivate networks. The cross-sectional nature of our quantitative data impedes us from
statistically tracking the changes in a firm’s network and product upgrading. It does
however allow us to evaluate how the composition and structure of a firm’s ego-network impact its product upgrading, and the plausibility of our key claim that Mendoza’s
policy approach facilitated firm access to a new variety of knowledge resources by creating new institutions with multiplex bridging qualities that fostered cross-cutting ties
between producer communities.
Our previous theoretical and empirical discussions argued that the alters, which appeared most valuable to firms, were those offering a new variety of applied knowledge
resources and cross-cutting channels of information and professional contacts between
different producer communities, especially the different zones. Mendoza’s approach appeared to improve access for firms to a variety of knowledge resources by creating a new
set of GSIs, the PPIs, and then reforming the old GSIs to offer new services directly to
firms and foster new types of relationships between them. Our qualitative analysis further suggested that wineries benefited most from their interactions with other firms and
the GSIs, because these alters, as opposed to the other types, offered the combination
of new knowledge resources and inter-active relationships for solving ongoing problems of product development. In contrast, pre-existing organizations, such as schools,
banks, associations, and cooperatives were not the repeated recipients of policies to
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new knowledge resources directly for the firm or remained focused in their membership, clientele, and social orientation toward their locality or zone. Furthermore, our
discussion above noted that Mendoza’s PPIs were especially effective because of the
ways in which their governance rules anchored their ability to act as social and knowledge bridges between distinct production communities or Zonas. That is, the evidence
suggested that alters, be they firms or GSI, could be effective hubs of diverse knowledge
resources because they would have ties to many firms from different Zonas.
McDermott et al. (2009) tested these qualitative claims by regressing a set of control
and network variables on a firm’s level of Product Upgrading, which measures the extent
to which the firm implemented practices associated with the introduction of new and
higher value wines, experimentation with new blends, varietals, and clones, monitoring
domestic and foreign markets.5 The explanatory, network variables measure the degree
to which a firm regularly interacts, collaborates, and exchanges information with different types of organizations and institutions, such as other firms, banks, schools, associations, cooperatives, and GSIs. Ties to Firms and Ties to GSIs were then decomposed
in two ways. First, the authors decomposed Ties to GSIs into Ties to Old GSIs and
Ties to PPIs, which are the new GSIs that Mendoza created in the 1990s. Second, to
capture our claim that firms gain access to diverse knowledge resources particularly via
mediating alters which themselves are tied to a variety of firms from different locations,
we decomposed Ties to Firms and Ties to GSIs into those that were the most central
and had the highest levels of network geographic diversity and those that were not. The
control variables were: Size, Foreign Ownership, Knowledge Stock, Upgrading Intent,
location dummies for the different zones.
Table 5 gives an abbreviated presentation of the results. The only control variables
that were consistently significant were Education and Upgrading Intent. The results
strongly suggest that product upgrading was greatly enhanced when a focal firm had
many and strong ties: a) to other (alter) firms and to GSIs; b) to PPIs but not other Old
GSIs; c) to firms and GSIs with the strongest centrality and bridging traits. If access to
diverse knowledge is key, then higher levels of upgrading should be associated with ties
to alters that have the highest centrality and bridging traits but not with ties to alters
that lack these traits. The results appear to broadly confirm our claim, but more so for
GSIs than for firms. The combination of these quantitative results and our qualitative
analysis suggest that a firm’s access to diverse knowledge resources depends on it being
tied not just to any or many organizations and institutions but particularly on its being
tied to those that excel in centrality and bridging qualities. These results have two important implications for public policy and innovation.
First, to the extent that access to a variety of knowledge resources is vital for firm
upgrading, the qualitative and quantitative evidence reframes our notion about which
types of alters may facilitate such access. Prior research on innovation has emphasized
5

The complete discussion of the methods, regressions, and the results can be found in McDermott, Corredoira & Kruse (2009).
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TABLE 5. Summary of regression results – impact of network ties on product upgrading of

focal firms (Full models with controls on firms demographics, locality, all types of ties)
Variables
Ties to Other Firms and to GSIs
Ties to Associations, Banks, Cooperatives, and Schools
Ties to PPIs vs. Ties to Old GSIs
Ties to Most Central Alter Firms
Ties to Most Central GSIs
Ties to “Bridging Firms” (highest degree of geographic
diversity)
Ties to “Bridging GSIs” (highest degree of geographic
diversity)

Statistical Significance
Positive, at the 0.01 level
Negative or Insignificant
Positive at the 0.05 level for PPIS
Positive, not Significant
Positive at the 0.05 level
Positive at the 0.05 level
Positive at the 0.05 level

Based on McDermott, Corredoira & Kruse (2009)

the importance of firms and associations providing cross-cutting relationships between previously isolated groups of firms (Fleming, 2001; Safford, 2007; Zuckerman
& Sgourev, 2006) and the role of GSIs helping diffuse knowledge in providing collective resources and having a public mission to share new knowledge (Breznitz, 2007;
Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). The evidence here supports a blending of the two views
in that the effectiveness of government programs are rooted in the institutionalization
of their network qualities. The innovation in Mendoza’s approach was developing a new
set of GSIs, the PPIs, with rules of inclusion and participatory governance. These rules
anchored the multiplex bridging qualities of PPIs that underpinned their ability to provide a new scale and scope of knowledge resources to firms and mold new relationships
between them. Hence, this research suggests that firms can improve their access to a
variety of knowledge resources and their attendant “combinatory capacities” (Moran
& Ghoshal, 1999, p. 409) if they participate in structures that are constituted with the
aforementioned institutional and network qualities.
Second, the evidence in its entirety suggests that organizational fields can be reshaped in different ways, primarily because one component – GSIs – is highly responsive to government policy. This is consistent with growing work on issues ranging from
technology diffusion to health care to emerging market corporate governance that
shows the impact of government policy in structuring inter-organizational networks
(Knoke, 2001; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Provan & Milward, 1995; Stark & Vedres, 2006). Hence, a long term consequence of Mendoza’s policy has been to reshape
the organizational field in ways that differed significantly from the province’s past and
from San Juan. For instance, Figure 4 offers a UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) depiction of the ties between focal firms and the entities we coded as GSIs, comparing the
two provinces. An immediate observation is that firms in Mendoza now live in a much
richer institutional environment than those in San Juan. Such a view coincides with the
increasingly growing argument that locational variables, some of which were significant in our models, should be viewed not simply as proxies for geography and natural
45

FIGURE 4. Ties between focal firms and GSIs-Mendoza & San Juan, 2005
Note: The circles on the left denote wineries in Mendoza. The triangles on the right denote wineries in San Juan.
The squares denote GSIs. Source: Authors’ survey data, 2004-05.

resources but as indicators of the different constellations of organizations and institutions, in which a firm is embedded (Granovetter, 2002; Locke, 2005; Owen-Smith &
Powell, 2004; Saxenian, 1994).

IV. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to offer an alternative view about the development of upgrading capabilities in firms from emerging markets. Building on prior work about the distinctive contributions clusters make toward knowledge creation (Tallman et al., 2004;
Arikan, 2009) and about the role of agency in reshaping socio-economic relationships
(Ghoshal, 2005), we have argued for a purposeful approach that emphasizes how public and private actors can construct new institutions that facilitate upgrading by acting
as social and knowledge bridges between previously isolated producer communities
even within the same region.
We proceeded in two steps. First, we found that the distinction between clusters and
industrial agglomerations is relevant from the conceptual, empirical and policy standpoint. Second, in order to achieve a fine-grained knowledge of how to transform existing industrial agglomerations into dynamic clusters, we focused on two cases studies in
Argentina. Our discussions of the transformation of the Argentine autoparts and wine
46

Knowledge

Upgrading

Clusters

Relationships
Type and selection
of Ties

Role of
Institutions

Figure 5. Clusters and upgrading – ex-post conclusions

sectors suggest relationships and organizational constellations are more malleable than
scholars assume.
We first showed how learning and upgrading are often products of specific types
of relationships with certain organizations. In turn, knowledge creation and diffusion
is a social process but key relationships are not equally distributed across firms. For
instance, the evidence from the autoparts sectors showed how domestic firms tend to
learn from just a few social ties to assemblers and from programs that promote pragmatic collaboration with customers. But does this mean that such ties cannot be replicated
and expanded?
The evidence from the Argentine wine sector suggests that they can. The experience from Mendoza revealed that governments can pursue policies that can improve
upgrading by helping recombine social and knowledge resources. That is, by creating
new public-private GSIs with relevant stakeholder groups, the Mendoza government
initiated a process whereby firms could build new relationships and learn more rapidly.
For instance, PPIs endowed with the principles of inclusion and participatory governance have multiplex bridging traits that improve the access firms have to a variety of
knowledge resources.
These findings enrich the original model presented in Figure 1, providing two new
phenomena: the type and selection of ties and the role of institutions. The new model is
presented in Figure 5. The model suggests that managers and policymakers do not have
to be passive actors beholden to existing structure but can improve innovation by creating institutions and organizations that have multiplex bridging traits discussed above.
The challenges for future research are, at least, twofold. The first challenge is to identify the types of relationships that foment co-creation and acquisition of knowledge,
and learning. The second challenge is to explore how public and private actors might
breed knowledge and learning in contexts where firms appear trapped in their existing
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social structure. In other words, the challenge is identifying the conditions for building
sustainable and learning relationships. In doing so, we would advance not only a much
more purposeful and pragmatic understanding of clusters and their impact on upgrading, but also a much more rigorous theory on development and international competitiveness of organizations and industries in emerging economies.
To the extent that our argument holds ground, it invites managers to explore strategies focused recombining their existing network ties and knowledge resources with
other organizations. Moreover, our argument suggests that managers view public policy
in terms not simply of greater public spending on industry or greater market liberalization but rather in the ways that they can collaborate with government to construct new
institutions that facilitate the co-creation of knowledge and relationship, therefore fostering upgrading during the very same process.
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